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PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND
PREVENTIVE CONFINEMENT OF CONVICTED PERSONS *
ANDREW VON HIRSCH t
I. INTRODUCTIONP reventive confinement-incapacitating an allegedly dangerous
individual in order to prevent him from engaging in pre-
dicted criminal conduct-is a concept that seems rather foreign
to our traditions of justice. We would be prone to assert that a
person may be deprived of his liberty, not on the basis of a
prediction of criminal behavior, but only on the basis of a de-
termination of guilt for a past offense. As the recent controversy
over pre-trial preventive detention in the District of Columbia
illustrates,1 it can arouse our concern or alarm when the state
seeks to incarcerate preventively those suspected of criminal ten-
dencies, even for brief periods. While predictions of dangerousness
This article is based upon a staff paper prepared by the author for the Committee
for the Study of Incarceration. The Committee is an interdisciplinary study group that
is conducting a general conceptual inquiry into incarceration and its alternatives. Oper-
ating under grants from the Field Foundation and the New World Foundation, the
Committee is composed of: Former U.S. Senator Charles E. Goodell (Chairman); Marshall
Cohen, Professor of Philosophy, City University of New York; Samuel DuBois Cook,
Professor of Political Science, Duke University; Alan Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Har-
vard University; Willard Gaylin, Professor of Psychiatry and Law, Columbia University;
Erving Goffman, Professor of Anthropology and Sociology, University of Pennsylvania;
Joseph Goldstein, Professor of Law, Science and Social Policy, Yale University; Harry
Kalven, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Jorge Lara-Braud, Executive Di-
rector, Hispanic-American Institute, Austin, Texas; Victor Marrero, Assistant Administra-
tor, New York City Model Cities Administration; Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairman,
New York City Human Rights Commission; David J. Rothman, Professor of History,
Columbia University; Simon Rottenberg, Professor of Economics, University of Massa-
chusetts; Herman Schwartz, Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo;
Stanton Wheeler, Professor of Law and Sociology, Yale University; and Leslie T. Wilkins,
Professor of Criminal Justice. State University of New York at Albany.
This article was aided and inspired by the Committee's discussions. The conclusions
stated herein, however, are to be taken as an expression of the author's own views-as
the Committee is still conducting its deliberations on the subject.
The author wishes to note his particular indebtedness to the writings, comments and
suggestions of Professor Alan Dershowitz, who is currently conducting an extensive inquiry
into the role of predictions of deviant conduct in the law.
t Executive Director, Committee for the Study of Incarceration, Washington, D.C.
A.B., Harvard College, 1956; LL.B., Harvard University, 1960.
1. For a summary of arguments against pre-trial preventive detention, see Ervin,
Foreword: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6 HARV. Civ.
RIGHrs-CIv. LIB. L. Rxv. 291 (1971); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in
the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371 (1970).
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have historically been used to justify confining mentally ill per-
sons, this practice also is beginning to generate criticism and
doubts.2
Yet once a person hifs been convicted of a crime, our scruples
about preventive confinement seem to disappear. Predictions of
criminal conduct regularly enter into decisions concerning the dis-
position of convicted criminal offenders. With little public notice
and few voiced objections, the state has been free to impose pro-
longed terms of confinement upon convicted persons predicted to
be dangerous, for the express or implied purpose of incapacitating
them from engaging in future criminal conduct; the duration of
these individuals' confinement may far exceed what would ordi-
narily seem justified as punishment for their past offenses. Thus
one is tempted to ask: "If we are so distrustful of preventive con-
finement in cases where there has been no conviction for a crime,
why should we so readily accept it after there has been a convic-
tion?" This paper will attempt to deal with that question.
A. Prevalence of the Practice of Preventive Confinement
Numerous examples could be cited in existing law involving
essentially preventive confinement of convicted persons predicted
to be dangerous. I shall mention just a few.
Canada has adopted a system explicitly termed "Preventive
Detention," authorizing the imprisonment of convicted multiple
offenders for an indeterminate term if:
[T]he court is of the opinion that because the accused is an
habitual criminal, it is expedient for the protection of the public
to sentence him to preventive detention.3
England, having had a system of Preventive Detention similar to
the Canadian one until 1967, still permits a judge to sentence an
2. For critical analyses of the use of psychiatric predictions in civil commitment pro-
ceedings for the mentally ill, see Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions
About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL En. 24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz, The Law of
Dangerousness]; Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways,
4 TRIAL 29 (Feb.-Mar. 1968); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1288 (1966).
3. CAN. REv. STAT. c. 34, § 688 (1970). According to the statute, an "habitual crimi-
nal" is one who has been previously convicted of three separate offenses punishable by
five years or more of imprisonment, and who is "leading persistently a criminal life." For
a description and history of the Canadian Preventive Detention law see MacDonald, A
Critique of Habitual Criminal Legislation in Canada and England, 4 U.B.C. L. REv. 87
(1969).
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offender for a term well beyond the maximum term for his last
offense, if, in the words of the statute, the court
is satisfied, by reason of his previous conduct and of the likelihood
of his committing further offences, that it is expedient to protect
the public from him for a substantial time . .4
One of the most overt schemes of preventive confinement in
this country is the Maryland Defective Delinquent Law.5 Under
the Maryland statute, an individual who has been convicted for
the first time of any of a wide variety of offenses (some rather
minor), may be indefinitely confined if he is found by a court,
on the basis of recommendations by a state medical board, to be a
"defective delinquent." To be classified as such, the individual
must meet two sets of criteria, one predictive and one quasi-psychi-
atric. The predictive criterion is that the individual
by the demonstration of persistent aggravated anti-social or crim-
inal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity ...
as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require
such confinement and treatment, when appropriate, as may make
it reasonably safe for society to terminate the confinement and
treatment.6
The quasi-psychiatric criterion is that the individual, though
legally sane, manifests "emotional unbalance" or "intellectual
deficiency." 7 If the individual is found to meet these criteria, then
he will be confined in a special institution for defective delin-
quents, Patuxent Institution. The term of his confinement is in-
determinate, can exceed the maximum term of punishment for
the offense of which he was convicted, and can even be for life.8
He is entitled to release only when it is determined that he no
longer meets the criteria for "defective delinquency" that justi-
fied his confinement. During confinement, he is supposed to be
4. Gr. Brit., Criminal Justice Act of, 1967, §§ 37-38. For a history of the British Pre-
ventive Detention law prior to 1967 see MacDonald, supra note 3.
5. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 31B (Supp. 1971). For a useful analysis of the Maryland statute,
see Note, "Defective Delinquent" and Habitual Criminal Offender Statutes-Required Con-
stitutional Safeguards, 20 RUTGERs L. REv. 756 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rutgers Note].
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on a constitutional challenge to the
Maryland law in Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub
nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Court, 92 S. Ct. 567 (1971).
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1971).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 9(b).
9. Id. § 9(a).
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subjected to an intensive program of rehabilitative treatment,
although a Maryland court has recently found that such treatment
is not being made available to the more recalcitrant prisoners.10
Colorado authorizes the preventive confinement of persons con-
victed for sexual offenses, if the court finds that such individuals
constitute "a threat of bodily harm to members of the pub-
lic." "I Confinement is for an indeterminate term, up to the life-
time of the defendant.12 According to a recent survey conducted
under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation, seventeen
other jurisdictions authorize the indeterminate confinement of
sex offenders or so-called "sexual psychopaths," with or without
a prior conviction. 13
The Model Sentencing Act proposes that a felony offender
convicted of certain serious crimes be sentenced for an extended
term of up to thirty years (thrice the maximum term of confine-
ment he otherwise could receive for such offenses) if the court,
after ordering a psychiatric examination, finds that "because of
the dangerousness of the defendant, such period of confined cor-
rectional treatment or custody is required for the protection of
the public" and if it further finds that he "is suffering from a
severe personality disorder indicating a propensity toward crim-
inal activity." 13a The Model Penal Code provides that a trial
judge, in sentencing a person convicted of a felony, may extend
the term of his imprisonment well beyond the maximum pro-
vided for that category of felony, when "the defendant is a dan-
10. McCray v. Maryland, Misc. Pet. No. 4363 (Md. Cir. Ct., Montgomery County,
Nov. 11, 1971).
11. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-11(2) (Supp. 1969). This is the current version of
the Colorado statute, revised since the U.S. Supreme Court held an earlier version uncon-
stitutional, in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). For comment on the Colorado statute,
see Note, Indiana's Sexual Psychopath Law, 44 IND. L.J. 242 (1969).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-3 (1969 Supp.).
13. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTrALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW ch. 10 (American
Bar Foundation rev. ed. 1971). According to this survey, these jurisdictions are Alabama,
California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and the District
of Columbia. The statutory definitions of "sexual psychopath," along with the statute cita-
tions, are set forth in this survey. Generally, the term "sexual psychopath" is used to refer
to an individual who is not legally insane, is suffering from some kind of emotional or
mental disturbance that makes him "disposed" to commit sex crimes, and is deemed to con-
stitute a danger to the community if permitted to remain at large.
13a. ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,
MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 5 (1963); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, GUIDES
TO SENTENCING THE DANGEROUS OFFENDER (1969).
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gerous, mentally abnormal person whose commitment for an
extended term is necessary for protection of the public." 13b
The California indeterminate sentence law gives an inde-
pendent sentencing board-the Adult Authority-plenary discre-
tion to determine release dates within the widest maximum and
minimum statutory limits. 1 4 The Adult Authority may-and ap-
parently does-determine the duration of an offender's confine-
ment in part upon the basis of informal estimates of his supposed
individual dangerousness.15
Essentially predictive judgments are also frequently made in
conventional parole situations. Since 1933, Illinois has made regu-
lar use of statistical prediction techniques in its parole system. An
actuarial prediction table of parole outcomes has been prepared
for each of the major institutions in the state. A sociologist-
actuary at each institution prepares a routine prediction report
based upon the tables for each inmate appearing at a parole hear-
ing. He computes the prisoner's statistical chances for making a
successful adjustment on parole; the final sentence in the report
reads: "This inmate is in a class in which _% may be expected to
violate the parole agreement." Together with sociological, psy-
chiatric and psychological reports and interviews by the parole
board, the predictive score is used to determine whether the pris-
oner is granted or denied parole.' 6
Based on the Illinois experience, several noted criminologists
have advocated more extensive and systematic use of prediction
tables in sentencing and parole decisions.'7 According to a nation-
wide survey conducted in 1962,"8 three other states-Ohio, Cali-
fornia and Colorado-had developed formal prediction tables for
application in individual parole decisions. While not using tables,
parole boards in other states regularly make informal estimates
13b. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1168, 3020 (West 1970).
15. See Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections on the
Neal Doctrine, 58 CALIF. L. Rav. 357, 379-83 (1970); Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment
in California, THE ATLANTric, March 1971, at 46.
16. Evjen, Current Thinking on Parole Prediction Tables, 8 CRIME AND DELIN. 215
(1962).
17. L. OHLIN, SrJLCrON FOR PAROLE (1951); Glaser, Prediction Tables as Accounting
Devices for Judges and Parole Boards, 8 CRIME AND DELIN. 239 (1962). Ohlln and Glaser de-
veloped the prediction tables in use in Illinois. Evjen, supra note 16.
For a valuable analysis and summary of prediction studies, see, H. MANNHEIM & L.
WILXINS, PREDICTION METHODS IN RELATION TO BORSTAL TRAINING (1955).
18. Evjen, supra note 16, at 216-17.
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of individual inmates' potential for future anti-social conduct in
determining whether to grant or deny parole; a recent American
Bar Foundation survey of sentencing and parole procedures found
that "the principal consideration in the decision to grant or deny
parole is the probability that the inmate will violate the criminal
law if he is released." 19
B. Scope of the Inquiry
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to define the scope of
this inquiry more precisely. Imprisonment has or may have as one
of its functions, the prevention of future crimes-even without
any attempt at prediction of individual dangerousness. Any de-
cision to confine a person convicted of a crime incapacitates him
from committing, during his period of confinement, any criminal
acts he might otherwise choose to commit against the outside
community. That is true even if the decision to confine is made
solely with reference to his past criminal conduct, and no effort is
made to forecast his individual future behavior. So long as it is
assumed that some convicted robbers (never mind which indi-
vidual ones) would be inclined to commit further offenses if al-
lowed to remain at large, imprisoning all convicted robbers for
a specified period of time might prevent some future robberies
from occurring. This kind of prevention is what might be called
prevention in the collective sense. It raises some important ques-
tions, worthy of careful study.20 However, it is outside the scope
of the present article.
19. R. DAWSON, SENTENCING ch. 11, at 263 (American Bar Foundation, Administration
of Criminal Justice Series, 1969).
20. If a specified term of confinement is imposed upon persons convicted of a criminal
offense, without any attempt at predicting individual dangerousness, that will (by tempo-
rarily incapacitating such of those offenders as would otherwise be disposed to commit fur-*'
ther offenses) prevent some crimes from occurring. The question remains, however, whether
the use of imprisonment will prevent a sufficient number of offenses from occurring (con-
sidering only its incapacitating effect, and leaving general deterrence aside) to provide the
public with a significant degree of net protection against crime. It also might be asked
whether the public protection that is achieved is sufficient to warrant the costs and other
negative side effects of the institution of imprisonment. Here, the following issues might be
explored in further detail:
(a) What percentage of the total number of actual offenders are apprehended, con-
victed and incarcerated for a given offense? For most types of crime-except, perhaps, mur-
der, bank robbery and a few others-the percentage appears to be quite small. If this per-
centage is small, then the public may obtain little added protection from the incapacitating
effect of incarceration upon confined criminals.
(b) What is the average rate at which persons incarcerated for a specified crime could
be expected to commit further offenses, if permitted to remain at large? If the rate is low,
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Instead, this article has a narrower scope. It is concerned
with prevention in the individual, predictive sense-where deci-
sions to confine persons turn upon official forecasts of their par-
ticular future conduct. More exactly, it focuses on this specific
question: is it appropriate to decide whether and how long to con-
fine a sane adult who has been convicted of a crime, on the basis
that he is deemed likely to engage in certain criminal conduct in
the future?
This topic is of particular interest for two reasons. It raises
questions of the reliability of predictions of individual danger-
ousness and of the policy consequences of erroneous predictions.
It also raises questions of the propriety of confining an individual
who is deemed of sound mind and full age for what he will do, not
what he has done.
It is to this kind of prevention-in the individual, predictive
sense-that I will be referring in this article when I use the term
''preventive confinement."
C. Conceptual Nature of the Inquiry
Techniques for predicting criminal behavior are still rela-
tively primitive, and existing schemes of preventive confinement
generally lack even minimal legal safeguards, as the discussion
below indicates. Thus it is easy enough to criticize preventive
confinement in the state in which it exists today.
The more difficult question-and the one with which this
article will primarily be concerned-is whether the concept of
preventive confinement is a sound one, assuming that prediction
techniques *and legal safeguards are improved. If the concept is
sound,2' then preventive confinement may be an important and
again, little public protection is achieved by incarceration. Generally, the rate is relatively
low for the more serious offenses.
(c) To what extent does the experience of imprisonment increase the propensity of
those confined to commit criminal acts upon release? If imprisonment is criminogenic-as
some studies suggest it might be-it may have a counter-preventive effect, by prompting
more crimes after release than are prevented during confinement.
(d) How cost-effective is imprisonment as a device for preventing crime by incapaci-
tating criminals, in view of the high per prisoner cost of confinement?
For a useful analysis of these issues, with some empirical data, see J. Robison, The
California Prison, Parole and Probation System (Tech. Supp. 2, Cal. Assembly, Preliminary
Report on the Costs and Effects of the California Criminal Justice System, April, 1969).
21. In evaluating the soundness of the concept of preventive confinement, I will be
examining its broad implications for social policy, rather than the narrower question of its
compliance or lack of compliance with legal and constitutional standards under the present
state of the law.
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fruitful area for further innovation and development. If not, it
may be a dangerous blind alley. In making this conceptual analy-
sis, theoretical models have been found helpful and will be used.
II. PREVENTIVE CONFINEMENT-A THEORETICAL MODEL
We might start our analysis by examining the following theo-
retical model:
The Preventive Confinement Model. In an imaginary
jurisdiction, a person convicted of a criminal offense
would be subject to preventive confinement for an in-
determinate term, if specified predictive criteria indicated
a high probability of his committing a serious offense in
the future. Following completion of his term in prison
for the offense of which he was convicted, he would be
transferred to and confined in a special facility designed
solely for preventive purposes, in which living conditions
would be made as "pleasant," i.e., as little punitive, as
possible, consistent with the fact of incarceration itself.
The individual would not be subjected to mandatory re-
habilitative treatment during confinement in this special
facility. The duration of confinement could substantially
exceed the maximum statutory term of punishment pre-
scribed for the offense of which he had been convicted.
He would be released only at such time as he is found no
longer to meet the predictive criteria for dangerousness.
In actual practice, preventive confinement frequently is
mixed with other elements. The Maryland Defective Delinquent
Law combines preventive confinement with mandatory treat-
ment.2" By giving the Adult Authority plenary discretion to
determine an adult offender's release date, the California indeter-
minate sentence law allows preventive considerations to be mixed
with judgments concerning punishment, treatment and institu-
tional convenience.2 In these contexts, it is difficult to isolate and
analyze the preventive component of decisions to confine.
In our theoretical model, however, the preventive component
is separately identified. The offender serves an indeterminate term
22. See text accompanying supra note 5.
23. See supra note 15.
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in a special facility in which confinement is for preventive pur-
poses only. The duration of confinement in that facility would
be set solely on the basis of a prediction of his individual future
dangerousness, without regard to the nature of his past offense.
Thus the model gives us the opportunity to evaluate pre-
ventive confinement in its more or less "pure state." Once. we
have done that, we will examine the effect of adding other com-
ponents to the model, such as mandatory rehabilitative treatment.
A. Threshold Requirements: Explicit Legal Standards of Dan-
gerousness; Validation of Prediction Method; Procedural
Safeguards
To have any possible merit, the model should satisfy three
important threshold requirements: (1) there must be reasonably
precise legal standards of dangerousness; (2) the prediction meth-
ods used must be subjected to careful and continuous validation;
and (3) the procedure for commitment must provide the de-
fendant with certain minimal procedural safeguards. These re-
quirements, however, are seldom met by current practices of
preventive confinement.
1. Explicit Legal Standards of Dangerousness. As Dersho-
witz 24 and Goldstein and Katz 25 have pointed out in connection
with the law of commitment of the insane, a supposedly "dan-
gerous" person should never be preventively confined, unless the
"danger" he poses is of sufficient gravity-and sufficient likeli-
hood-to warrant deprivation of his freedom. That determination
-of the seriousness and likelihood of the predicted misconduct
required to justify confinement-is a value judgment the law
should make; it is not a factual judgment within the professional
competence of psychiatrists or other expert witnesses. Failure to
provide explicit legal standards of "dangerousness" creates the
unacceptable situation where, for example, one psychiatrist can
decide that only those mental patients who are likely to perpe-
trate violent crimes ought to be confined, while another psychia-
trist, depending upon his personal philosophy, can employ the
24. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness, supra note 2.
25. Gbldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the
Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YA.E LJ. 225 (1960).
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concept of "dangerousness" to confine potential minor offenders,
as well.
These considerations apply with equal force to the preven-
tive incarceration of convicted persons. Yet existing preventive
confinement schemes seldom, if ever, provide legal standards of
dangerousness which have any definiteness. The Maryland De-
fective Delinquent Law, for example, authorizes commitment of
individuals who demonstrate an "actual danger" to society. 20 No
definition is supplied of what constitutes such a danger; nor is
there even a statutory requirement that the supposed "dangerous-
ness" be seriously criminal in character.
Unless "dangerousness" is defined by law with some minimal
degree of precision, the entire preventive model may well be un-
constitutional on grounds of vagueness.2 7 Thus a threshold re-
quirement for acceptability of the model would be a reasonably
precise statutory definition of "dangerousness": one that specifies
what kind of future criminal conduct, and what degree of likeli-
hood of that conduct, warrants preventive confinement.
2. Validating the Predictive Method. In commitment pro-
ceedings for the mentally ill, there is rarely any effort made to
check the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness by
following up and tabulating their results.28 The same absence of
validation pervades the existing preventive confinement practice
for some offenders. No systematic follow-up is made, for example,
of the predictions of dangerousness under the Maryland Defective
Delinquent Law. Even among states that utilize prediction tables
as an aid to parole decisions, validation is not always attempted.21
Not surprisingly under these circumstances, unverified pre-
26. See text accompanying supra note 6.
27. See Rutgers Note, supra note 5. This 1966 Rutgers Law Review Note argues that
the Maryland Defective Delinquent Law is void for vagueness because the criterion for
dangerousness-"actual danger to society'-is so imprecise as to leave the crucial decision of
what kind of future conduct warrants incarceration wholly to the discretion of individual
psychiatrists, without giving the courts any workable criteria for decision-making. The Note
contends that the law's invalidity for vagueness does not depend upon whether it is classi-
fied as a civil or criminal statute. The vagueness question may be considered in the coming
Supreme Court test of the constitutionality of the statute, Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d
1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Court, 92 S. Ct. 567
(1971). See also Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals:
Perspectives and Problems, 56 VA. L. REv. 602 (1970).
28. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness, supra note 2.
29. Glaser, supra note 17, at 257.
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dictions of dangerousness prove fallible, indeed, when their accu-
racy is subsequently examined by scholars. In his ongoing study
of the accuracy of psychiatric prediction in commitment proceed-
ings for the mentally ill, Dershowitz notes:
[I] was able to discover fewer than a dozen studies which followed
up psychiatric predictions of antisocial conduct. And even more
surprisingly, these few studies strongly suggest that psychiatrists are
rather inaccurate predictors; inaccurate in an absolute sense, and
even less accurate when compared with other professionals, such as
psychologists, social workers and correctional officials, and when
compared to actuarial devices, such as prediction or experience
tables. Even more significant for legal purposes: it seems that psy-
chiatrists are particularly prone to one type of error-overpredic-
tion. In other words, they tend to predict anti-social conduct in
many instances where it would not, in fact, occur. Indeed, our re-
search suggests that for every correct psychiatric prediction of vio-
lence, there are numerous erroneous predictions.30
Predictions by supposedly "expert" correctional personnel
show the same proneness to error, as a study by Hakeem sug-
gests.31 He requested ten trained parole officers and ten laymen
with no correctional experience to make a series of predictions of
parole survival on the basis of case summaries of 200 parolees,
half of whom had been recommitted for parole violations and half
of whom had not. He found that the laymen were substantially
more accurate predictors than the parole officers. Moreover, both
groups combined made fewer correct identifications of the non-
violators than would have been made by random selection.32
Aside from inaccuracy, hazards of class and racial discrimina-
tion inhere in giving psychiatrists, correctional officials or other
supposed "experts" carte blanche powers to make predictive de-
terminations of dangerousness-unless the predictive criteria used
are first carefully validated. Psychiatrists or parole board.members
of middle class backgrounds can and do, all too easily, misinter-
30. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness, supra note 2, at 46. See also, J. RAPPEPORT,
CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1967); Morris, The Con-
fusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally Ill Criminals
and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the State of New York, 17 BUFFALO
L. REv. 651 (1968).
31. Hakeem, Prediction of Parole Outcome from Summaries of Case Histories, 52
J. CRim. L.C. & Ps. 145 (1961).
32. Id. at 149-50.
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pret lower-class or nonconforming styles and attitudes as symp-
toms of supposed "dangerousness." 33
If this kind of laxity is carried over to the model system of
preventive confinement, that alone would be sufficient to condemn
it.
Thus a second threshold requirement for acceptability of the
model would be that its predictive method carefully be validated
in advance of being applied in actual decisions to confine; and be
subject to continual follow-up and review.
Adequate validation studies of the predictive technique in
the model are required, regardless of whether the predictive
method is purely statistical, purely clinical, or a mixture of the
two.34 Clinical evaluation avoids statistics in the projection it-
self, but the statistician must always have the last word in judging
the accuracy and utility of the evaluation method; as Meehl points
out in his Clinical vs. Statistical Prediction:
All clinicians should make up their minds that of the two uses of
statistics (structural and validating), the validating use is unavoid-
able. Regardless of one's theory about personality and regardless of
one's choice of data . . . ; regardless of how these data are fused
for predictive purposes-by intuition, table, equation, or rational
hypotheses developed in a case conference-the honest clinician can-
not avoid the question 'Am I doing better than I could do by
flipping pennies?' . . .
Is any clinician infallible? No one claims to be. Hence, some-
times he is wrong. If he is sometimes wrong, why should we pay
any attention to him? There is only one possible reply to this
'silly' question. It is simply that he tends (read: 'is likely') to be
right. 'Tending' to be right means just one thing-'being right in
the long run.' . . . [We thus] have no recourse except to record
our predictions at the time, allow them to accumulate, and ulti-
mately tally them up. . . . If the clinical utility is really established
and not merely proclaimed, it will have been established by proce-
dures which have all the earmarks of an acceptable validation
study.3 5
3. Procedural Safeguards. Certain basic procedural safe-
guards-too often lacking today-should be built into the preven-
tive model.
33. AMEUCAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE ch. 5 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as AFSC REPORT].
34. See text accompanying note 47, infra.
35. P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VS. STATISTICAL PREDICTION 136-38 (1954).
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At minimum, a full hearing should be required before any
convicted individual is committed for preventive confinement.
That hearing should be separate from the trial for his past offense,
because the issues involved (for example, his supposed dangerous-
ness) are distinct from the issues at trial. At this hearing, he must
have the rights of counsel, confrontation and cross-examination
of witnesses, and the right to call his own witnesses .3 The Supreme
Court has struck down a sexual psychopath law which denied
such a hearing,37 but many such state laws still abridge full im-
plementation of these rights." The Maryland Defective Delin-
quent Law, while providing a hearing and a right to counsel at
the hearing, denies the defendant the right to confront and cross-
examine staff psychiatrists whose reports are used in determining
his status as a defective delinquent 9
A requirement more difficult to satisfy but equally important
relates to indigents' right of representation. To conduct any kind
of effective defense, an indigent defendant would not only need
to have competent counsel provided for him but also to have ac-
cess to competent expert witnesses able to challenge the state's
prediction of his supposed dangerousness.40 That would involve
very considerable expense, which would have to be assumed by
the state. The defendant's expert witnesses, to testify effectively
on behalf of their client, would need, for example, to conduct ex-
tended psychiatric observations of the defendant, or run valida-
tion studies to check the accuracy of past predictions of
dangerousness made by the state's expert witnesses. This will
require a very much more ambitious and costly legal services pro-
gram than is available today. But without it, indigent defendants
will be virtually helpless to defend themselves, and the entire
model would violate basic standards of procedural fairness.
A still more difficult question relates to the privilege against
36. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
37. Id.
38. For a summary of state court decisions concerning the applicability of procedural
due process safeguards in sexual psychopath proceedings, see Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 652 (1970).
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B (Supp. 1971); Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th
Cir. 1971).
40. The Maryland Defective Delinquent Law provides an indigent defendant with a
psychiatric witness at state expense, but no provision is made to enable the witness to con-
duct the kind of extended psychiatric observation needed to challenge the state's psychia-
trists-who have had the defendant confined under prolonged observation. MD. CODE ANN.
art. 31B § 7(b) (Supp. 1971); Rutgers Note, supra note 5.
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self-incrimination. If the privilege applies to preventive confine-
ment under the model-and there are arguments to suggest that
it should 41-then the individual could be confined only if a pre-
diction could be made on the basis of independently obtained
data; the individual could not be compelled to cooperate with
psychiatric investigations designed to determine whether he is
dangerous. If that were so, the preventive model probably could
not be implemented unless and until the predictive art had pro-
gressed to the point where it could rely safely upon "objective"
data and dispose with psychiatric investigations in making pre-
dictions.
B. Theoretical Impediments to Prediction: The False Positive
Problem
Even if these threshold requirements are satisfied, however,
the preventive model will encounter a formidable theoretical im-
pediment to prediction: the false positive problem.
1. The Significance of False Positives. Starting in the early
1920's with S. B. Warner's statistical study of recidivism among
prisoners paroled from the Massachusetts State Reformatory and
with the Gluecks' widely publicized prediction studies, an exten-
sive literature has developed concerning the statistical prediction
of parole recidivism and of delinquency.42
As Wilkins points out in his perceptive Evaluation of Penal
Measures,8 there has been a tendency in this predictive literature
to adopt a rather one-sided criterion for success. A prediction
table for delinquency or recidivism is thought effective if it can
correctly forecast a relatively high proportion of those individu-
als who actually become delinquent or recidivist. The other side
of the coin is less often considered: the so-called false positives-
those mistakenly predicted to engage in such deviant conduct.
41. See S. BRAKEL : R. RoCK, supra note 13, ch. 10, and Note, Indiana's Sexual Psycho-
path Law, supra note 11, arguing that the privilege against self-incrimination should apply
in sexual psychopath proceedings; People v. Potter, 85 Il1. App. 2d 151, 228 N.E.2d 238
(1967), holding that, on the basis of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605 (1967), the privilege against self-incrimination should be applicable to pro-
ceedings under the Illinois Sexual Offender Act. Contra, Rutgers Note, supra note 5;
Haskett v. Marion Criminal Court, 250 Ind. 229, 234 N.E.2d 636 (1968).
42. The Warner, Glueck and other studies are summarized in H. MANNHEIM & L.
WLUMNS, supra note 17, ch. 1.
43. L. WILKMNs, EVALUATION OF PENAL MEAsUREs ch. 5 (1969).,
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There has been an inclination to overlook how many non-delin-
quents or non-recidivists a prediction table incorrectly classifies
as potentially deviant.
In certain types of prediction, the criteria for success need
not be too seriously concerned with false positives. If, for exam-
ple, we develop a prediction table for recruitment into the army,44
the table may well be useful if it successfully identifies a high per-
centage of individuals actually unsuitable for the service, who can
then be screened out. If the manpower pool is ample, it does not
really matter that the predictive index also yields a substantial
number of false positives-individuals actually suitable for the
service who are rejected as a result of a mistaken prediction of un-
suitability. For the Army does not need to recruit all suitable per-
sons; and the impact upon affected individuals of a mistaken
prediction of unsuitability generally is not damaging.
In predicting criminal conduct, however, the consequences
of ignoring the false positives are much more serious. As Wilkins
points out:
Taking a sample of offenders and showing that a large proportion
would have scored in the delinquent category does not validate the
prediction. Yet claims of this kind are frequently found. If decisions
are made upon the basis of prediction statements, it is to be ex-
pected that the consequences of errors in each class will be differ-
ent. It may be more damaging to regard (predict) a person as
delinquent or recidivist when this is incorrect, than to incorrectly
regard a person as nondelinquent or nonrecidivist. Some recent
writers have claimed that the first kind of error can lead to a self-
fulfilling prophecy-the labeling process of classification as "likely
delinquent" may change the perception of the person by others,
and through this, his own self-image.4 5
In the context of our model system of preventive incarcera-
tion, we can afford little tolerance, indeed, of prediction methods
that show a high yield of false positives. Here, mistakenly pre-
dicting nondangerous individuals to be dangerous is gravely dam-
aging-for it can lead to their prolonged incarceration.
Because of the historical lack of concern with the question,
44. For an example of such a prediction study designed for Army recruitment pur-
poses, see Danielson & Clark, A Personality Inventory for Induction Screening, 10 J. CLiN.
PSYcHOL. 137 (1954). The design of that study, however, was criticized in Meehl & Rosen,
Antecedent Probability and the Efficiency of Psychometric Signs, Patterns and Cutting
Scores, 52 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 194 (1955).
45. L. WxLINS, supra note 43, at 69-70.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the existing prediction indices for juvenile delinquency and parole
recidivism seldom tabulate the actual rate of false positives. Yet
where the false positive rate has been calculated for existing pre-
diction tables, it turns out to be disturbingly high.48
It has sometimes been suggested that statistical predictive
indices should be used only to identify the risk category in which
offenders are located; and that selection of individuals within a
given risk category for release or continued confinement should
then be made by the parole board on the basis of clinical observa-
tion. However, this suggestion does not solve the problem of
false positives in the model. Given what we know of the fallibility
of psychiatrists' and correctional officials' clinical forecasts, 4 there
is no reason to expect that their predictive choices-even within
statistically defined risk categories-will be dramatically free of
false positives, where the prediction tables themselves are not. As
Wilkins states:
It is sometimes claimed that subjective judgment can help in re-
gard to these kinds of error. Where the tables may fail to find the
ten who will succeed in the 90 percent failure group, the human
intelligence will be able to identify them. This is sometimes claimed
by those who recognize that the human subjective intelligence is
not adequate in any other part of the range of assessment. They
want to cooperate with the tables, helping them when they fail.
These kinds of claims for clinical supplementation of statistical
tables have not been supported by any evidence. Their belief that
46. For example: Gottfredson developed a prediction table for parole recidivism, based
upon California Base Expectancy scores, and applied it to a validation sample of 2,132
California male parolees. The lowest score category (Base Expectancy scores 0-4)-which
indicated the highest expectancy of recidivism-correctly identified slightly under 10% of
all violators in the sample; but 26% of those in this category were false positives. Those
scoring in the lowest third of the sample (in percentile terms) constituted 46% of the actual
violators; but 33%'o of those in this low scoring group were false positives. Gottfredson, The
Base Expectancy Approach, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND COIuEmrION 807-13 (N.
JOHNSTON, L. SAVrrZ & M. WOLFGANG eds. 1970). Wenk and Robison applied more elaborate
prediction tables for parole recidivism, developed by Gough, Wenk and Rozynko and
based upon the California Psychological Inventory and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory scores, to a large group of paroled California Youth Authority wards (the sample
used in this study is described in the text accompanying note 57, infra). Again, the results
were disappointing, with over 50% of those predicted to be violators being false positives,
and with the incidence of correct predictions being lower than it would be by random
selection. E. Wenk & J. Robison, Assaultive Experience and Assaultive Potential, May 1971
(unpublished paper, National Council on Crime and Delinquency Research Center, Davis,
Cal.). See also Gough, Wenk & Rozynko Parole Outcome as Predicted from the CPI, the
MMPI, and a Base Expectancy Table, 70 J. ABNOIMAL PSYCnOL. 432 (1965).
47. Glaser, supra note 17, at 247-48.
48. See text accompanying supra notes 30 and 31.
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something of this kind of supplementation should be possible seems
again to originate in an inability to come to terms with uncer-
tainty. For them, probability must be supplemented so that a de-
terministic model is provided-then a decision can be madel 49
The false positive issue, therefore, must squarely be faced.
2. The Rare Event and False Positives: The Rosen Suicide
Model. It might be hoped that with increased attention to the
false positive problem and sufficient expenditure of time, money
and effort, superior predictive indices could be developed which
would be relatively free of false positives. That hope, however,
may be misplaced-for there exist theoretical impediments to pre-
diction of criminal conduct notwithstanding such efforts at im-
provement.
Generally speaking, criminal conduct tends to have two char-
acteristics which make it resistant to accurate prediction:
(1) It is comparatively rare. The more dangerous the con-
duct is, the rarer it is. Violent crime-perhaps the most dangerous
of all-is the rarest of all.
(2) It has no known, clearly identifiable symptoms. Predic-
tion therefore becomes a matter of developing statistical correla-
tions between observed characteristics of offenders and subsequent
criminal conduct.
Where those two conditions obtain, false positives show a high
degree of persistence, even in a theoretical predictive model.
In a valuable 1954 article, Albert Rosen 50 of the University
of Minnesota developed a theoretical model for predicting suicide
among mental patients, that illustrates this problem. Rosen con-
structed a hypothetical suicide detection index for an assumed
population of 12,000 mental patients. On the basis of existing
suicide statistics, he assumed that the rate of suicides was very
low-one third of one percent of the total patient population.
With this low rate, only 40 patients out of the initial population
of 12,000 would actually commit suicide. Thus, without any test,
all patients in this population could be predicted to be non-sui-
cidal, and the prediction would be right in 992A% of all cases.
49. L. WILKINS, supra note 43, at 128-29.
50. Rosen, Detection of Suicidal Patients: An Example of Some Limitations in the
Prediction of Infrequent Events, 18 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 397 (1954).
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A hypothetical suicide detection index would have to perform
better than this in identifying the potential suicides.
Rosen assumes such a hypothetical index is developed as fol-
lows: (1) the patient population is divided into two groups-
patients who actually committed suicide during confinement (sui-
cide population), and patients who did not (non-suicide popula-
tion); (2) a random sample is selected and analyzed from each
population; (3) a predictive index is developed, based upon the
test data which significantly differentiate the two criterion sam-
ples; (4) a cutting line is established-that is, a differentiating
score on the index, so that patients testing above that score would
be classified as suicidal and patients testing below that score
would be classified as non-suicidal; and (5) the cutting line is
cross-validated-i.e., it is validated with new suicide and non-
suicide samples, every psychiatric patient over a period of years
being scored on the indexY1
Such an index, Rosen finds, can identify a significant number
of true positives only by mis-identifying a very much larger num-
ber of false positives. If an effort is made to reduce the false
positives to a manageable number, only a tiny fraction of the true
positives can be spotted-and even then, there are many more false
positives than true positives. 2
Suppose the cutting line is established at a point where,
after cross-validation, the index will correctly identify 75% of the
patients in both the suicide and the non-suicide populations, re-
spectively. Using this cutting line, the index will correctly iden-
tify 30 of the 40 actual suicides. However, Rosen indicates, it will
also incorrectly identify 2,990 non-suicidal patients as potentially
suicidal.3 The false positive rate here is so high as to make the
prediction, in his words "[of] no appreciable value, for it would
be impractical to treat as suicidal the prodigious number of mis-
classified cases." 54
Suppose, then, a much higher cutting line is established-
one which, when cross-validated, will correctly identify 90% of
the non-suicide cases. It is assumed that the new cutting line
redtices to 60% (regarded by Rosen as a liberal estimate) the pro-
51. Id. at 398.
52. Id. at 399-400.
53. Id. at 399.
54. Id.
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portion of correctly classified suicidal patients. Using this new
cutting line, the index will correctly identify 24 out of 40 actual
suicides, but still will mis-identify as suicidal 1,196 false positives.
This is still "an impractical instrument because of the large num-
ber of false positives." 5r
With every elevation of the cutting line, Rosen shows, there
would be some reduction in the number of false positives. How-
ever, there would be a corresponding shrinkage in the number of
true positives. And the false positives will continue to greatly
outnumber the true.
If the cutting line is raised to the point where it screens out
99.5% of the non-suicide cases, then, Rosen estimates, the predic-
tive index will be able to spot only 2.5% of the actual suicides.
Thus the problem remains unsolved. Only 1 out of 40 actual sui-
cides are correctly identified; and to achieve this meagre result,
60 false positives will still have to be predicted.
To achieve a better result, the experimenter might try to
seek to develop a predictive index for a special diagnostic sub-
group that has a substantially higher suicide rate than the gen-
eral mental patient population. But, as Rosen points out,58 there
are inherent limitations in this approach. Any such diagnostic
subgroup would be unlikely to have a suicide rate much higher
than two percent, and that still would yield an excessive number
of false positives. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the
actual suicidal patients in the entire sample population would
then be excluded from the diagnostic subgroup.
3. Violent Crimes and False Positives. Like suicide, crimes
of violence are infrequent events. They are rare not only among
the general population, but also (as will be discussed below)
among previous offenders who have been released. The Rosen
model thus has applicability to violent crimes, as well as to sui-
cide. Predictions of violence tend to yield large numbers of false
positives.
What makes violence so particularly difficult to predict is
not merely its rarity, but its situational quality. Deterministic
models to the contrary notwithstanding, violence generally is not
a quality which inheres in certain "dangerous" individuals: it is




an occurrence which may erupt-or may not-in certain crisis situ-
ations. Whether it does erupt, whether it is reported, whether the
perpetrator is apprehended and punished, depend upon a wide
variety of fortuitous circumstances, largely beyond the actor's
control. Not only the actor's proclivities, but the decisions of
other individuals-the victim, the bystanders, the police, the
magistrate-may determine whether an act of violence occurs and
whether it comes to be included in the criminal statistics. Trying
to predict violence on the basis of information concerning only
the supposedly violence-prone individual-without taking these
numerous external contingencies into account-is trying to solve
a multi-variable problem by keeping track of only one variable.
It is a hazardous undertaking, indeed.
The difficulty of predicting violent criminal behavior is
strikingly illustrated by a recent study by Wenk and Robison of
violent recidivism among California Youth Authority wards 7
Wenk and Robison examined the records of all juvenile offenders
who were processed during 1964-66 through the Deuel Recep-
tion-Guidance Center, a diagnostic unit that examines older
juvenile offenders at the time they are committed to the Youth
Authority. A follow-up study was made of their behavior on
parole for a period of 15 months after release from confinement-
with a view to determining how many were recommitted for a
violent offense. As nearly one quarter of the sample had originally
been committed for a violent offense or had a history of known
violent behavior, the violence potential of the group might have
been expected to be relatively high. Nevertheless, the investi-
gators found that of this entire group, the incidence of violent
recidivism during the 15-month follow-up period was only 2.4%.8
As Rosen's analysis of his suicide model indicates, constructing a
hypothetical predictive index upon a base rate as low as that-only
2.4%-would yield an unmanageable number of false positives.
Wenk and Robison's own tentative analysis supports this
conclusion. They requested a psychologist and a statistician to
project hypothetical predictive indices for violent recidivism,
based upon the data in their sample. The less pessimistic projec-
57. E. Wenk & J. Robison, Assaultive Experience and Assaultive Potential, May 1971
(unpublished paper, National Council on Crime and Delinquency Research Center, Davis,
Cal.).
58. Id. at 27.
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tion-that of the psychologist-was that a multi-variable multiple
regression equation could be developed from the data, which
could identify about one-half of the true positives, but in which
the false positives would outnumber the true positives by a dis-
couraging eight to one.59
4. Selection of High-Risk Subgroups. One strategy men-
tioned by Rosen "I for avoiding the false positive problem was to
develop a predictive index only for narrowly defined subgroups of
the original sample population, which manifest a considerably
higher rate of the behavior to be tested. Applying this strategy
to predictions of violent crime, we might try to construct a pre-
dictive instrument only for special subgroups of the convicted
offender population, which manifest a substantially higher rate
of violence.
The Wenk and Robison study suggests, however, that there
may be serious obstacles to such a strategy. Their investigation
identified five subgroups which manifested higher rates of vio-
lent recidivism than the general sample population.6 The sub-
groups were: (1) offenders with known histories of violence;
(2) offenders originally committed on a violent offense charge;
(3) offenders committed to the Youth Authority for the fourth
time or more (i.e., multiple recidivists); (4) offenders with his-
tories of "moderate to serious" opiate involvement; and (5) of-
fenders referred to a psychiatrist for violence potential upon
commitment to the Youth Authority.62 The investigators' results
indicated that none of these subgroups manifested a high enough
incidence of violent recidivism to avoid the false positive prob-
lem. The highest rate (for category 5) was 6.2%; the other cate-
gories showed rates of about 5% or less.6 These rates are well
below the frequency needed for constructing an instrument rela-
tively free of false positives-which, as Meehl and Rosen64 esti-
mate, should be closer to 50%.
Moreover, Wenk and Robison found that all these subgroups,
except the first, account for a rather small fraction of the total
59. Id. at 47.
60. See text accompanying supra note 56.
61. Wenk & Robison, supra note 57, at 27-38.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Meehl & Rosen, supra note 44.
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incidence of violent recidivism in the sample population. For
example, offenders in category (5), which manifests the highest
rate of violence, account for only 15% of the total incidence of
violence on parole in the entire group. This creates another dif-
ficulty. If to construct an accurate predictive index, we are forced
to limit its application to defined, high-risk subgroups that ac-
count for only a small fraction of the total occurrence of violence,
then the public obtains little additional protection from pre-
ventive confinement so limited in scope.
5. Inclusion of Lesser Offenses. Another avoidance strat-
egy might be to include nonviolent offenses-since they are much
more frequent. In the Wenk and Robison study, for example, if
all parole violations are considered-which include not only vio-
lent crimes but also property crimes and other lesser offenses-
then the recidivism rate climbs to a more statistically manageable
39.9%. Another serious objection is encountered here, however.
To obtain the needed higher offense rates, we find ourselves fast
descending the scale of seriousness toward the minor offenses.
Then, it becomes increasingly difficult to demonstrate a need for
societal protection of the degree of urgency that could conceiva-
bly warrant the kind of deprivation of liberty contemplated in
the model. It should be recalled that the model involves incarcer-
ation for an indeterminate period that may be quite prolonged,
perhaps lifelong.6 5
6. Concealing Overprediction. Even were we to extricate
ourselves from this last difficulty we face another formidable theo-
retical problem: any system of preventive incarceration conceals
erroneous confinements, while revealing erroneous releases.00
The individual who is wrongly identified as dangerous is con-
fined, and thus has little or no opportunity to demonstrate that
he would not have committed the crime had he been released. The
individual who is wrongly identified as non-dangerous remains
at large, so it comes to public attention if he later commits a crime.
Thus, once a preventive system is established, it creates the illu-
65. As will be recalled, indeterminate terms of confinement are utilized in the model
in order to assure that an individual predicted to be dangerous remains confined-and thus
unable to harm the community-until he is found no longer dangerous.
66. Dershowitz, On Preventive Detention, in Ctarm, LAw AND SOCIETv 307-19 (A.S.
GOLDSTEIN & J. GOLDSTEIN eds. 1971); Tribe, supra note 1, at 372-73.
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sion of generating only one kind of evidence: evidence of errone-
ous release, that prompts decision-makers to expand the categories
of persons who are preventively confined. In short, a system of
preventive confinement creates a self-fulfilling prophecy for the
need of more preventive incarceration.6
Preventive confinement will also make it difficult to deter-
mine with any degree of confidence when a person ceases to be
dangerous, and may be released. For the predictive criteria, in
all likelihood, will largely rely upon the individual's behavior
patterns in the relatively recent past. Incarceration itself will
temporarily distort or suppress those behavior patterns, thus leav-
ing few accurate clues concerning his probable behavior upon
release.
Moreover, the problem of distortion of evidence would
greatly be compounded by political-bureaucratic pressures. Under
a system of preventive confinement, the public undoubtedly
would hold officials responsible if they fail to incarcerate (or if
they release) persons who subsequently do commit violent crimi-
nal acts. This would create overwhelming pressures upon officials
to overpredict-since it would entail much less risk to the institu-
tion and to their own careers for them to confine (or fail to re-
lease) persons who actually are or have become harmless, than to
release persons who are actually dangerous and do subsequently
perpetrate crimes.
C. Evaluationof the Model-With False Positives
We are now ready to evaluate our model of preventive con-
finement. Let us begin by assuming that the technique of predic-
tion used in the model manifests a relatively high incidence of
false positives. More specifically, let us suppose that the prediction
method generates false positives at a rate which substantially ex-
ceeds the rate of erroneous convictions under the existing system
67. To avoid this distortion of the evidence, it has been suggested that a random
sample of the population of those preventively confined be released from time to time,
and the accuracy of the prediction be tested upon that sample. That may get us involved,
however, in the problem of infrequent events. If we are trying to predict violent crimes,
where the offense rate is very low, a substantial number of persons would have to be
released at random in order to be able to measure the effectiveness of the criteria. This
would pose serious problems of fairness for those who remain subject to confinement.
Also, any large-scale random release could reduce the effectiveness of the system as a
measure of public protection-and rekindle much of the public anxiety that the preventive
system is designed to alleviate. But see Dershowitz, On Preventive Detention, supra note 66.
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of criminal justice for those categories of ogenses. (Since there is
little available evidence concerning the rate of mistaken convic-
tions, it is difficult to confirm that any given rate of false positives
would, or would not, substantially exceed it. But if the rate of
false positives is of the high order of magnitude discussed in the
preceding analysis-say, the eight false positives to every one true
positive suggested by the Wenk and Robison study-it is fairly
safe to conjecture that, in Dershowitz' words, "any system of pre-
dicting future crimes would result in a vastly larger number of
erroneous confinements" 68 than could be expected to occur under
the present criminal justice system.) Later, we will go on to make
an evaluation of the model in the context of a hypothetical "ideal"
predictive technique that is relatively "free" of false positives.
1. Inappropriateness of Cost-Benefit Rationale. To sustain
the model where false positives are present, a cost-benefit ration-
ale must be assumed. Proponents of preventive confinement must
argue in terms of "balancing" the individual's interest in not
being mistakenly confined against society's need for protection
from the actually dangerous person. It has to be contended that
the "benefit" of preventing the really dangerous individual from
committing future crimes exceeds, in the aggregate, the "cost"
of mistakenly identifying and confining the nondangerous one.
Even if this kind of cost-benefit thinking were appropriate,
it is highly questionable whether the preventive confinement
model could be justified in its terms-once the magnitude of the
"cost" of confining large numbers of false positives is fully taken
into account. That is especially true because-for reasons just
noted-strategies designed to minimize the number of false posi-
tives also sharply reduce the number of true positives that can be
identified-and hence, minimize the social benefits of the system
as a crime prevention device.
The more basic point, however, is that cost-benefit thinking
is wholly inappropriate here. If a system of preventive incarcera-
tion is known systematically to generate mistaken confinements,
then it is unacceptable in absolute terms because it violates the
obligation of society to do individual justice. Such a system can-
not be justified by arguing that its aggregate social benefits exceed
68. Dershowitz, supra note 66, at 313.
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the aggregate amount of injustice done to mistakenly confined
individuals.
2. The Parallel of Conviction of the Innocent. In our
criminal law, a whole variety of safeguards exist-most notably,
the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-
designed to assure that an innocent person is not convicted or
punished. There, aggregate cost-benefit theories would definitely
be inappropriate. Would reducing the standard of proof in crimi-
nal cases to a "preponderance of the evidence" yield favorable
cost-benefit results-in terms of yielding a greater increase in num-
bers of convictions of the guilty than in numbers of additional
convictions of the innocent? Perhaps so, perhaps not; but it does
not really matter. A reduction in the standard of proof is abso-
lutely unacceptable if it would materially increase convictions of
the innocent. As Tribe states:
Indeed, the very enterprise of formulating a tolerable ratio of false
convictions to false acquittals puts an explicit price on an innocent
man's liberty and defeats the concept of a human person as an
entity with claims that cannot be extinguished, however great the
payoff to society.
This argument does not imply that we do or should insist on
absolute certainty; we properly instruct juries to convict if they
believe that guilt has been established "beyond a reasonable doubt"
rather than "beyond all doubt." We do so, however, only because
total certainty is incompatible with the human condition, and we
do not wish to immobilize the system by demanding the impossible.
Thus, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt represents not a lawyer's
fumbling substitute for a specific percentage, but a standard that
seeks to come as close to certainty as human knowledge allows-one
that refuses to take a deliberate risk of punishing any innocent
man.
69
The Supreme Court has recently held that "the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged." 7o The Court cited three
reasons for its decision. Its first reason was that of simple fairness
69. Tribe, supra note 1, at 387-88.
70. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Court held that the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applied both to criminal and juvenile delinquency
proceedings.
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(an individual should not be subjected to the deprivations of
punishment if there is any reasonable doubt he deserved it):
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of
immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that
he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society
that values the good name and freedom of every individual should
not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is rea-
sonable doubt about his guilt . . . ;71
its second, the need to uphold the moral force of the law:
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable
to command the respect and confidence of the community in ap-
plications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of
the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof which
leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being con-
demned . . . ; 72
and its third, the need to preserve citizens' sense of security from
wrongful state interference:
It is also important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government can-
not adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. 73
Assuming for the sake of argument that the state is entitled
to confine actually dangerous individuals (an assumption to be
examined below), the mistaken preventive confinement of actu-
ally nondangerous persons can no more be tolerated than the
conviction of the innocent. We are speaking here, of course, of
persons who have already been convicted of crimes. But by hy-
pothesis in our model, they have already served the full punish-
ment for their past offense, and are being preventively confined
for an additional time designed expressly and solely to incapaci-
tate them from committing future crimes. Hence, the past con-
viction would not cure the unfairness inherent in preventively
incarcerating nondangerous persons. After all, if a man is con-
victed of robbery and serves the maximum term in prison, we
still would object to further imprisoning him for an alleged past
murder of which he was wholly innocent. Why should we be more
71. Id. at 363-64.
72. Id. at 864.
73. Id.
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tolerant of taking a man who has been convicted and has served
the full time for the robbery and confining him for more years to
prevent a future murder which in fact he would never commit if
given his freedom?
Even if preventive confinement is not officially labelled "pun-
ishment," the deprivations of prolonged preventive confinement
would be much like those of prolonged imprisonment. The loss
of liberty would be the same. So would many of the other un-
pleasant aspects of confinement, such as forced association with
other persons, some of whom may well be actually dangerous.
The social obloquy of confinement would be similar-since label-
ing someone a potential criminal would have much the same
stigmatizing effect as labeling him a past offender.74
3. Reduced Trial Safeguards. If accused of a crime, an in-
dividual has recourse to various traditional trial safeguards that
enable him to defend himself against a false charge. The prosecu-
tion has to meet a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
It cannot show that the defendant had a propensity to commit
criminal acts, 75 but must establish that he had the opportunity to
commit, and did actually commit a specific crime. Thus the de-
fendant, if he has effective counsel, can escape conviction by cast-
ing doubt upon the evidence connecting him with the offense.
These safeguards would not be available in a preventive pro-
ceeding. A standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be
virtually meaningless, and could not be applied. Given all the
contingencies affecting future occurrences, how can any future
74. The force of this argument-that preventive confinement of the false positives
is essentially unjust-does not, in fact, depend upon whether such confinement is classi-
fied as punishment. Even if it is regarded as a precautionary, rather than a punitive
measure, the justification of preventively confining an individual would depend upon his
actually being dangerous. The individual is being deprived of his liberty because, if he
were to remain at large, he would interfere with the liberty of others by committing
crimes. If he is not in fact dangerous, this justification simply collapses; and what we have
left is gratuitous suffering imposed upon a harmless individual.
See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), where the Supreme Court ruled that
the mere fact that juvenile delinquency proceedings were legislatively designated as civil,
instead of criminal, did not obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards, includ-
ing proof beyond reasonable doubt.
For comment on reasons for the different treatment of the insane, see note 79 infra.
75. Generally, evidence of a defendant's propensity for criminal conduct is not even
admissible in a criminal trial. See Comment, Procedural Protections of the Criminal De-
fendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Exclud-
ing Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crimes, 78 HArv. L. R y. 426, 435-43 (1964).
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event be predicted beyond a reasonable doubt? We can at least
imagine what it would be like to be sure beyond reasonable ques-
tion that X has committed a murder; but how could we imagine
being so sure he will do so, since he could always change his mind,
be arrested beforehand, be killed in an accident, etc.? How, par-
ticularly, could we be so sure if we know our predictive method
yields false positives and there is no way of ascertaining whether
he is one of the false or one of the true positives? Moreover, evi-
dence of a mere propensity to commit criminal acts would, neces-
sarily, have to be sufficient to incarcerate. The defendant would
have no way of challenging his actual connection with the crime
-for the crime would be in the future. (How, for example, could
he establish an alibi for an offense which has not yet occurred?) 70
D. Evaluation of the Model-Minus the False Positives
Thus far, the objection to preventive confinement has cen-
tered upon the false positive issue-the injustice inflicted upon
those wrongly confined on the basis of an erroneous prediction
of dangerousness. Is this, however, the only objection? If it is, then
it might be worthwhile to labor to overcome the obstacles to pre-
diction, formidable as they are, with a view ultimately to estab-
lishing a system of preventive confinement when and if the
accurate prediction of criminal conduct can be achieved.
Or do more fundamental evils inhere in the preventive con-
cept-even if the false positive problem is assumed not to be pres-
ent? If so, the entire concept deserves to be scrapped.
To answer these questions, we should inquire: how would
we judge the preventive model described earlier, were we to as-
76. Dershowitz has also pointed out that in a criminal trial, imperfect as it is, thejudge and jurors have "some sense of what it means to decide whether a specifically
charged act probably was or was not committed . . . some basis for sorting out the rele-
vant from the irrelevant, the believable from the incredible, the significant from the
trivial." Dershowitz, supra note 66, at 315. In a preventive proceeding, the regular par-
ticipants in the judicial process would be ill-equipped to judge the validity of the
prediction. In a traditional courtroom, one might imagine what predictive trials would
become when they were contested: baffling arguments between prosecution and defense
expert witnesses, each claiming superior expertise and offering contrasting clinical or sta-
tistical judgements. A lay judge and jury (if there is a jury) will find such evidence much
harder to evaluate intelligently than evidence of past crimes.
To provide greater expertise to the decision-makers, preventive confinement might
be decided upon by specialists. That, however, would remove the traditional safeguard of
lay control over the judicial process. If the experts decide, who chooses the experts and
judges their performance?
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sume that a predictive technique had been developed which is
reasonably free of false positives? More specifically, let us hypoth-
esize that the predictive technique mis-identifies false positives at
a rate which is no greater than the rate of convictions of innocent
persons for past crimes which are assumed to occur under the
existing system of criminal justice.77
1. Universal Preventive Confinement. To evaluate the
model assuming such a "foolproof" predictive technique, we
might start by inquiring: "If our predictions are so accurate, why
limit the model to previously convicted persons; why not pre-
ventively confine anybody found to be potentially dangerous?"
If, as we shall find, there are serious objections to such a universal
scheme of preventive confinement, then we should ask: "What, if
anything, is there about a prior conviction that renders our pre-
ventive model any more acceptable?"
What are the objections, then, to a universal system of pre-
ventive confinement, assuming we can predict criminal conduct
with a high degree of accuracy? Suppose a preventive system is
established which is similar to our model in all major respects but
one-it is not limited to persons who have already been convicted
of crimes. If any individual meets specified standards of probable
cause for being dangerous, the state could initiate commitment
proceedings against him. After a full hearing, with maximum
feasible procedural safeguards, he would be preventively confined
for an indeterminate term if the predictive criteria indicate that
he can be expected to commit a serious crime if permitted to
remain at large.
Even with an accurate predictive technique, such an Orwell-
ian scheme would be unacceptable, for two major reasons.
(1) Universal preventive confinement would run counter to
basic concepts of individual liberty: it would deny individuals
the fair opportunity to make their own decisions and order their
own lives. A system of criminal justice which imposes specified
punishments for specified crimes gives us some degree of assur-
ance that we can, in Hart's words,
predict and plan the future course of our lives within the coercive
framework of the law. For the system which makes liability to the
law's sanctions dependent upon a voluntary act not only maximizes
77. But see Tribe, supra note 1, at 385-88.
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the power of the individual to determine by his choice his future
fate; it also maximizes his power to identify in advance the space
which will be left open to him free from the law's interference.78
In a system of preventive confinement, this safeguard would be
lost; an individual would have little choice as to whether he is
confined or remains at large. His liberty would depend not upon
his voluntary acts, but upon his propensities for future conduct
as they are seen by the state. Far from being able "to identify in
advance the space which would be left free to him from the law's
interference," his liberty would depend upon predictive determi-
nations which he would have little ability to foretell, let alone
alter by his own choices.
Our constitutional scheme assigns a high value to the right
of individual choice; this is reflected, for example, in the guaran-
tees of free speech, free assembly and free association. It is like-
wise reflected in the basic rule of our criminal jurisprudence,
that a sane adult may not be deprived of his liberty except as
punishment for a crime of which he has been convicted.79 The
law thus warns that specified modes of anti-social conduct will be
met by unpleasant consequences, including incarceration for a
specified time. But the choice-whether to engage in such conduct
and chance the punishment-is left up to the individual; the state
will not intervene unless he has been found to have violated the
law. By giving him that choice, society risks that the individual
will make the wrong selection, to the community's detriment. Sim-
78. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 181-82 (1968).
79. An exception has historically been made of the insane-who have been subjected
to preventive confinement without the requirement of a prior conviction, if deemed to be
"dangerous to themselves or others." Little concern has been shown with safeguarding
mental patients' rights of individual choice-because, in part, they have been regarded as
persons incapable of choosing: that is, so cognitively and emotionally deranged that, for
them, choice has little or no meaning. As one commentary put it:
Another explanation might be found in the assumption that society's rules can-
not deter the mentally ill from acting dangerously. Whether persons who are
not mentally ill commit dangerous acts or avoid them is thought to depend on a
process of choice. This process is respected and valued; only by not confining
even those who can be accurately predicted to be dangerous can all persons be
permitted to make the choice. On the other hand, whether mentally ill persons
act dangerously is thought to depend not on their own choice but on the chance
effects of their disease. Confining them hinders no respected process.
Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 2, at 1291. This view of mental
illness has been questioned, see Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for
Civil Commitment, supra note 2. Whatever its merits, this justification points up the high
value assigned to individual choice, in the case of persons not deemed insane.
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ilar hazards are entailed by'other constitutional guarantees. Free
speech risks incitement to violence; free assembly risks riot; free
association risks criminal conspiracy. Nevertheless, we choose to
withhold the coercive power of the law until after the event. In so
doing, we may incur the costs of certain anti-social conduct that
might have been precluded by state preventive action. But that is
felt to be well worth the assurance given to individual freedom.
Universal preventive confinement is inconsistent with this
concept of individual choice. Because a prescient and paternalistic
state is assumed to know that certain individuals will make the
wrong choice, it confines them precisely for the purpose of de-
priving them of the opportunity of choosing at all. Even if the
state's predictions are imagined to be highly accurate, such a
scheme would entail undue sacrifice of individual freedom and
dignity.
The force of this argument, it should be noted, does not
depend upon any particular psychological or philosophical view
of individual choice. Do individuals consciously weigh the risks
when they decide whether or not to comply with the law-or do
they act upon impulse, habit and social pressure? Are individuals
really free to choose between legal and illegal conduct, or is their
choice determined by their backgrounds and experiences? Inter-
esting as these questions may be in themselves, they are of no
relevance here. As Herbert Packer points out, we are not describ-
ing the process of individual choice, but expressing -a value pref-
erence for limiting state intrusion into citizens' lives:
Neither philosophic concepts nor psychological realities are actually
at issue in the criminal law. The idea of free will in relation to
conduct is not, in the legal system, a statement of fact, but rather
a value preference having very little to do with the metaphysics of
determinism and free will. The fallacy that legal values describe
physical reality is a very common one .... But we need to dispose
of it here, because it is such a major impediment to rational
thought about the criminal law. Very simply, the law treats man's
conduct as autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because
it is desirable to proceed as if it were. It is desirable because the
capacity of the individual human being to live his life in reasonable
freedom from socially imposed external constraints (the only kind
with which the law is concerned) would be fatally impaired unless
the law provided a locus poenitentiae, a point of no return beyond
which external constraints may be imposed but before which the
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individual is free-not free of whatever compulsions determinists
tell us he labors under but free of the very specific social compul-
sions of the law.80
(2) Preventive confinement also would entail unjustified
risks of abuse. If the government had the power to designate any
individual as dangerous and to confine him preventively regard-
less of any prior determination of guilt, it could misuse that power
to incarcerate for racial, social or political ends. Granted, we are
assuming here that a highly accurate predictive technique has
been developed. However, the mere fact that such a technique is
known to exist provides no guarantee that government-once it
has the power of universal preventive confinement-will opt for
that technique alone and will not resort to biased prediction de-
vices. Prediction being such a highly technical matter, the differ-
ence between an accurate and a distorting predictive instrument
could depend upon subtle shifts in the data base, the sampling
and validation methods, and the prediction variables and equa-
tions employed. It would be difficult, indeed, to develop workable
constitutional or legal safeguards, that could effectively be admin-
istered by the courts, to assure that such distortions not be made.
Nor could there be an effective popular check on abuses, given
the arcane nature of the entire subject.
Of course, any human institution is susceptible to abuse.
However, our tolerance for abuse diminishes as the institution's
potential intrusiveness into citizens' lives increases. Universal pre-
ventive confinement has great potential intrusiveness. By aban-
doning the requirement of a prior criminal act, it reduces the
protections and immunities available to individuals against state
interference, and permits the state to confine a larger number of
individuals, at an earlier time, and for a longer period than the
criminal law would allow. Where the degree of intrusion can be
so great, the risks of abuse implicit in a scheme of preventive con-
finement seem truly unacceptable.
2. Preventive Confinement for Those Convicted. If a
scheme of universal preventive confinement is unacceptable, why
is our model any better? It differs from the universal scheme in
only one significant respect: it is applicable solely to persons who
80. H. PACKER, THE LimTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968).
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have been convicted of a crime. The fact of a prior conviction,
however, gives no additional sustenance to the scheme.
It cannot be argued that the fact of the prior conviction jus-
tifies the preventive confinement in the model as punishment.
For we are assuming in the model that the individual has already
served the maximum statutory term of punishment for the past
offense, and is now serving extra time that is expressly intended
to be preventive, not punitive.
Nor can it be asserted that the supposed greater dangerous-
ness of convicted persons justifies their preventive incarceration.
A universal system of preventive confinement would not be ren-
dered acceptable if its application were limited to the most dan-
gerous individuals. With an accurate method of prediction-which
we assume to be available-a finding of dangerousness would not
have to depend upon the presence or absence of a prior convic-
tion. Some persons who had never been convicted might well be
found to be more dangerous than their convicted brethren.
The two major policy objections to universal preventive con-
finement, just described, would seem equally applicable to our
model.
Objection (1)-the individual's loss of the fair opportunity
"to identify in advance the space which will be left open to him
free of the state's interference"-applies as well to the model. An
individual who commits an offense will have no way of determin-
ing whether, in addition to being liable to punishment if he is
apprehended, he will be subject to indeterminate and possibly
lifelong confinement on the basis of a prediction of dangerous-
ness. The possible result-the indeterminate confinement-is well
beyond the reasonably foreseeable risk involved in committing an
offense. True, he may be on notice that if he commits the offense,
there is some possibility of his being subjected to indeterminate
preventive confinement, whereas none exists if he complies with
the law. However, the degree of likelihood of his being so con-
fined if he commits an offense depends not upon the nature and
quality of his chosen acts, but upon the state's determination of
his proclivities.
A violation of law may warrant punishment and punishment
involves the temporary suspension of certain rights, including in
some instances the right to liberty. In the model, however, we are
speaking of the offender at a point in time where he has fully
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served his punishment; where he once again should be able to
regain most, if not all of the ordinary rights of a citizen-includ-
ing at least the right to remain free from seizure of his person by
the state unless and until he has committed another offense.
Objection (2)-risk of abuse-applies a fortiori to the class
of convicted offenders. Widely feared because of their past con-
duct 81 and drawn predominantly from the most under-privileged
segments of society, convicted persons would have the most to fear
from a deliberate "slanting" of the predictive criteria.
E. Preventive Confinement as "Punishment"
It is worth exploring more thoroughly whether a scheme of
preventive confinement could be supported by resort to the con-
cept of punishment. To do so, let us vary our original model
slightly as follows:
Variation 1 of the Model. The legislature provides gen-
eral maximum terms of imprisonment for various of-
fenses. However, it provides that where any convicted
offender meets specified predictive criteria for future
dangerousness, he will be subject to an indeterminate
term of confinement, possibly exceeding the normal maxi-
mum penalty, until he is adjudged no longer dangerous.
The additional confinement would be classified by law as
punishment and as an addition to the sentence for the
crime of which he has been convicted; it would be served
in a regular prison, rather than a special, less rigorous
preventive facility.
Thus in the revised model-unlike the original model-pre-
ventive confinement is officially labelled as punishment for the
prior offense and is served under conventional punitive condi-
tions, i.e., in a regular prison. This change in the model is de-
signed to enable us to focus squarely on the issue: can preventive
confinement be justified as punishment for the prior offense? 82
It is a basic principle of justice that the severity of punish-
ment should not unduly exceed the gravity of the offense. While
81. See Harris poll on public attitudes toward convicted offenders in JOINT COMMIs.
SION ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING, THE PUBLIC LOOKS AT CRIME AND COR-
RECTIONS (1968).
82. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 78, ch. 1, at 4-6.
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the legislature has wide discretion in defining the seriousness of
offenses and determining the severity of punishments, it is subject
to some moral and constitutional limits. The old English practice
of hanging pick-pockets would now be regarded as repugnant. On
at least one occasion, the Supreme Court has invalidated a crim-
inal statute that imposed excessive fines and an extended prison
term for a relatively minor crime. The Court in Weems v.
United States 8 3 ruled the eighth amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishments extended not only to barbaric punishments,
but also to prolonged punishments that were in no way propor-
tional to the offense committed.
It is likewise a basic principle of justice-although one
widely ignored in practice in our criminal justice system-that
persons guilty of equally serious offenses should not be subjected
to grossly unequal punishments.8 4
These are what Hart s5 calls principles of distribution-that
is, principles limiting the way punishment may properly be dis-
tributed among individuals. As Hart points out, they should ap-
ply whether or not one adopts a retributive theory of the general
aim of punishment."6
Suppose, for example, we reject the view that retribution for
moral guilt is the main purpose of punishment, and hold instead
that punishment serves the object of deterring the general pub-
lic from engaging in criminal activity. Even with this deterrence
philosophy, we should still-in fairness to the individuals affected
-insist that punishment not be disproportionately severe in rela-
tion to the gravity of the offense. That being so, we should oppose
the infliction of severe exemplary punishments upon certain in-
dividuals convicted of minor offenses, however useful that might
be in deterring that type of offense.8 7
83. 217 U.S. 349 (1910), invalidating a statute imposing a penalty of from 12 to 20
years imprisonment at hard and painful labor for the crime of falsifying official records.
For a comment on this case, see Rutgers Note, supra note 5; Katkin, Habitual Offender
Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 99 (1971).
84. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 78, ch. 1; AFSC REPORT, supra note 33, ch. 3, 9. See
also United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-ION OF CRaMINAL JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS
23-24 (1967); S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND rrs PROCESSES 1284-87 (1969).
85. H.LA. HART, supra note 78, ch. 1.
86. Id. at 11-13.
87. Hart explains this point as follows:
The further principle that different kinds of offence of different gravity
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If we consider prevention to be the main purpose of punish-
ment, the same principles of justice still limit the manner in
which we distribute punishment among individuals. Punishments
of grossly disproportionate severity, and grossly unequal punish-
ments for similar offenses, would still be objectionable.
Obviously, the application of these principles depends upon
how we judge the seriousness of the offense. (Their application
may also depend upon the extent to which we take into considera-
tion the personal culpability of the offender. Should there, for
example, be uniform penalties for each category of offense, dis-
regarding the actor's state of mind except insofar as necessary to
ascertain whether his conduct was intentional, negligent, acciden-
tal etc., as some reformers have recently recommended? Il Or
should we continue to permit judges and parole boards to vary
the punishment for an offense in order to reflect the actor's per-
sonal culpability, as indicated by his apparent motives, character
or personal history? 8l) Without needing to resolve these difficult
questions, it is fairly evident that the revised model violates the
two principles of justice of which we are speaking. This is so be-
cause the revised model authorizes the imposition of indetermi-
nate, even lifelong imprisonment, without regard to the serious-
(however that is assessed) should not be punished with equal severity is one
which like other principles of Distribution may qualify the pursuit of our Gen-
eral Aim and is not deducible from it. Long sentences of imprisonment might
effectually stamp out car parking offences, yet we think it wrong to employ them;
not because there is for each crime a penalty "naturally" fitted to its degree of
iniquity (as some Retributionists in General Aim might think); not because we
are convinced that the misery caused by such sentences (which might indeed be
slight because they would rarely need to be applied) would be greater than that
caused by the offences unchecked (as a Utilitarian might argue). The guiding
principle is that of a proportion within a system of penalties between those im-
posed for different offences where these have a distinct place in a commonsense
scale of gravity. This scale itself no doubt consists of very broad judgements both
of relative moral iniquity and harmfulness of different types of offence: it draws
rough distinctions like that between parking offences and homicide, or between
'mercy killing' and murder for gain, but cannot cope with any precise assessment
of an individual's wickedness in committing a crime (Who can?). Yet main-
tenance of proportion of this kind may be important: for where the legal grada-
tion of crimes expressed in the relative severity of penalties diverges sharply from
this rough scale, there is a risk of either confusing common morality or flouting
it and bringing the law into contempt.
H.L.A. HART, supra note 78, ch. 1, at 25. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECt ON
1MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNA-
TIVES AND PROCEDURES 56-61 (1968).
88. See AFSC REPORT, supra note 33, ch. 9.
89. See, e.g., R. DAwsON, supra note 19, at 79-93.
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ness of the offender's past offense-however such seriousness may
be defined.
Consider the example of robbery. Under the revised model,
the ordinary robber could be confined for no more than a speci-
fied number of years. But the robber who has the misfortune of
being predicted to be dangerous would be subject to imprison-
ment for as much as his entire life. This would be objectionable
for the two reasons just stated: 1) confinement for as much as a
lifetime for the crime of robbery would, by any humane stan-
dards, be disproportionately severe in relation to the character of
the offense, and 2) such prolonged confinement would be dis-
criminatory against the robbers classified as dangerous, because
their punishment would far exceed the penalty suffered by equally
culpable robbers who happen not to be predicted to be dangerous.
Here, assuming the prediction of dangerousness to be accu-
rate would not cure these objections. For the individual is, by
hypothesis, serving the additional time as punishment, under
punitive conditions. The punishment can be imposed only for
the past offense-the robbery. If the extra time cannot be justified
as punishment for the past robbery, then it cannot be justified
with reference to the predicted crime, regardless of its prospective
heinousness. For it likewise offends basic concepts of justice to
punish someone-if confinement is seriously intended as punish-
ment-except for a past offense 0 Hence the revised version of the
model would be unacceptable, whether one assumes false positives
are involved or notY1
F. Addition of Rehabilitative Treatment
It has been suggested that the imposition of compulsory re-
habilitative treatment gives justification to a scheme of preventive
confinement.9 2 This suggestion is worth critical examination.
90. See H.LA. HART, supra note 78, ch. 7. See also H. PACKER, supra note 80, at 78-79.
91. The concept of punishment might justify imposing longer sentences upon mul-
tiple offenders than upon first offenders-on the ground that a persistent course of crimi-
nal conduct evidences a greater degree of culpability. However, the model cannot be
rescued by limiting its application to recidivists. Even for second robbery offenders, for
example, an indeterminate and possible lifelong sentence would seem excessive; and select-
ing some second robbery offenders (namely, those predicted to be dangerous) and not
others (namely, those not so predicted) for such harsh treatment would, again, be dis-
criminatory. For a useful analysis of habitual offender laws, see Katkin, supra note 83.
92. See, e.g., Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964), upholding the Maryland
Defective Delinquent Law.
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To do so, let us again vary our original model, this time to
provide the additional element of compulsory individualized
treatment.
Variation 2 of the Model. The legislature provides
maximum terms of imprisonment for various criminal
offenses. It prescribes, however, that where any convicted
offender meets the predictive criteria for dangerousness,
he will be subject to preventive confinement for an in-
determinate period that may exceed the maximum stat-
utory term of imprisonment for his offense. Preventive
confinement would be served in a special facility under
conditions of minimum rigorousness; there, he would be
required to undergo psychological, educational and voca-
tional rehabilitative treatment. Either the offender would
first serve a prison term for his past offense and then be
transferred to this special facility; or else he could be sent
immediately to the special facility. In either case, he
would not be released from the special facility until he
no longer met the criteria for dangerousnessY3
Here, the individual's alleged need for treatment, alone, could
not justify his being preventively confined-even were it supposed
that he is suffering from an emotional or personality disturbance
and could be genuinely helped by the treatment. For he is as-
sumed to be an adult and-despite his psychological troubles-
legally sane. Without the added elements of the prior conviction
and the prediction of dangerousness, it could hardly be contended
that the state had the right to confine any sane adult (even if he
is somewhat disturbed) solely for therapeutic treatment, against
his will.
Nor would the prior conviction alone justify his confine-
ment. For we are assuming, again, that the period during which
the individual is being confined for treatment exceeds the maxi-
mum statutory term of punishment for the offense of which he
was convicted.
The justification of the mandatory treatment must depend,
93. This revised model closely resembles Maryland's Defective Delinquent Law-
described in the text accompanying supra notes 5-9-except that the procedures and pre-
dictive criteria would be improved to meet the threshold requirements described in part
II-A of this article.
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therefore, upon the prediction of dangerousness itself. The indi-
vidual is being committed for treatment because he is thought to
be dangerous, precisely for the purpose of "'curing" him of his
dangerousness. Were he not found dangerous he would not have
to be treated.
The only functional difference between the original model
of preventive confinement and this revised model of treatment-
oriented confinement, is the manner by which they are designed
to protect the community from individuals who are deemed dan-
gerous. Pure preventive confinement operates only by incapaci-
tating the individual; whatever his propensities for injuring the
community, he is rendered incapable of exercising them because
he is isolated. Treatment-oriented confinement operates by trying
to eliminate these propensities in the individual, through a pro-
gram of rehabilitative therapy; the individual is confined in order
to assure his availability for the treatment program, and also in
order to incapacitate him from doing harm during the interim
period while the treatment is being administered and is sup-
posedly taking effect.
Treatment could permit earlier release, assuming-and this
assumption itself has been questioned 94-that it can be effective.
Under the preventive model, the individual simply remains in
confinement until such time as he changes sufficiently of his own
accord so that he ceases to meet the criteria of dangerousness.
Under the revised, treatment-oriented model, an effort would be
made to hasten the process of change-and hence the prospects of
his release-by application of the appropriate rehabilitative ther-
apy. Despite these differences, however, both models have essen-
tially the same purpose: to safeguard society against persons who
have been identified by specified predictive criteria as individu-
ally dangerous if permitted to remain at large.
Thus the treatment-oriented model ultimately rests upon
the same assumption as the purely preventive model: that society
94. Several studies have shown that existing rehabilitative treatment programs have
had little or no measurable success in reducing recidivism rates. See G. KASSEBAUM, D.
WARD & D. WILNER, PRISON TREATMENT AND PAROLE SURvIvAL (1971); Robison & Smith,
The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELIN. 67 (1971). The concept
of mandatory rehabilitative treatment has also been attacked as having functioned almost
exclusively as a pretext for widening the discretion of law enforcement and correctional
officials, and having aggravated the repressive and discriminatory features of the correc-
tional system. AFSC REPORT supra note 33, chs. 3, 6.
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has the right to deprive persons of their freedom on the basis of
individual predictions of future dangerousness. If for the reasons
earlier explained, that assumption is unacceptable as applied to
the original preventive model, it cannot sustain the treatment-
oriented model either. (The false positive problem, for example,
does not disappear merely because we choose to impose treat-
ment upon the individuals who are mistakenly identified as dan-
gerous.)
G. Implications for Current Practice
It is wise to be cautious in translating conclusions developed
from a theoretical model to the real world; for the question can
always be asked: "How do you know the real world is similar to
the model in all the relevant respects?" In the field of preventive
confinement, sufficient data concerning current practices is not
available to enable us to answer this question with any certainty.
However, some tentative conclusions might be ventured.
First, the foregoing analysis calls into serious doubt the ra-
tionality and fairness of overt schemes of preventive confinement
in existing law-such as the Canadian Preventive Detention stat-
ute, the Maryland Defective Delinquent Law and the Colorado
sexual offender statute, described at the beginning of this paper.
Any such system-which takes legally sane individuals who have
been convicted of crimes, makes predictions of their individual
future dangerousness, and subjects them on the basis of such pre-
dictions to prolonged confinement, in excess of what could legally
be imposed as punishment for their prior offenses-shares the
essential defects of the models we have been analyzing. This con-
clusion holds also for the recommendations of the Model Sentenc-
ing Act and the Model Penal Code which would impose ex-
tended terms of confinement upon certain "dangerous" offenders.
Second, the analysis raises questions concerning the use of
predictions of dangerousness in sentencing and parole decisions.
Are sentencing judges and parole boards attempting to make in-
dividual assessments of the supposed dangerousness of convicted
persons coming before them? To what extent do these assessments
affect decisions concerning imposition and duration of confine-
ment or grant or denial of parole? Is there evidence that individu-
als predicted to be dangerous receive materially longer sentences
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or serve materially longer terms of confinement than other of-
fenders with similar offense histories not so predicted? Do indi-
viduals predicted to be dangerous receive terms of confinement of
a duration that substantially exceeds what would ordinarily be
regarded as appropriate as punishment for the past offense, if its
seriousness alone is considered? A definitive answer to these ques-
tions would require a much more detailed investigation of existing
law and practice than the scope of this theoretical analysis permits.
However, if the answers to these questions are affirmative (as one
might well suspect to be often the case) then the law is being used
to create de facto preventive confinement-that would be subject
to essentially the same objections as apply to the theoretical
models discussed in this paper.
III. CONCLUSION
In this article, the following question was considered: "Is it
appropriate to decide whether and how long to confine a person
convicted of a crime on the basis of a prediction of his supposed
individual dangerousness?"
To examine this question, we constructed a hypothetical
model where a person convicted of a criminal offense is subjected
to preventive confinement for an indeterminate term-possibly
well in excess of the maximum statutory term of punishment for
the crime of which he was convicted-if specified predictive cri-
teria indicated a high probability of his committing a serious
offense in the future. It was assumed that the model met certain
threshold criteria, namely: that there would be a reasonably pre-
cise legal definition of "dangerousness"; that the predictive cri-
teria would be adequately validated in advance; and that certain
minimum procedural safeguards would be adopted.
Our analysis indicated that predictions of dangerousness
would, because of the infrequency of the events to be predicted,
generally yield a high incidence of false positives-that is, persons
mistakenly predicted to be dangerous. Where numerous false posi-
tives are confined, the model was found to offend fundamental
conceptions of individual justice.
Even if the predictive methods were assumed to be highly
accurate, preventive confinement in the model was found not sus-
tainable, because it infringed the right of individual choice and
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entailed significant risks of abuse. The preventive confinement
could not, moreover, be justified by reference to concepts of pun-
ishment for the prior offense.
The addition of mandatory rehabilitative treatment, like-
wise, did not sustain the model, for the function of treatment
itself was dependent upon the prior finding of individual danger-
ousness.
Thus, under our analysis, the model scheme of preventive
confinement failed. The consequence of that failure for current
practice has been examined.
Preventive confinement requires the assumption that con-
viction of a crime relegates the offender, even after he has com-
pleted the punishment for his prior offense, to permanent
second-class status. The erroneous incarceration of false positives;
the risk of abuse of prediction methods; and the abdication of con-
cepts of personal choice which are inherent in such a scheme can
be excused only if it is assumed that their infliction upon con-
victed persons does not matter-because, as a class, these persons
are expendable. As Caleb Foote stated:
It is a prerequisite for any system of preventive detention that you
assume that those detained are going to be second-class citizens.
The false positives are viewed as more expendable in the debates
on preventive detention. Judges and psychiatrists who support pre-
ventive detention assume that a mistaken identification of one ac-
tually safe person who is predicted to be dangerous is much less
serious than the release of one actually dangerous person. The oper-
ating rationale, therefore, is much like that of a search-and-destroy
mission. Some dangerous Viet Gong may be eliminated, and the
civilians and children are expendable. 95
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